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1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, scholarly research has re-
vealed the existence of numerous highly influential ep-
istemic communities—basically defined as knowledge-
based networks—that have swayed the trajectory of 
international cooperation by virtue of their shared pro-
fessional expertise (Adler, 1992; Cross 2013a; Drake & 
Nicolaïdis, 1992; Gough & Shackley, 2001; Haas, 1989, 
1992b; Ikenberry, 1992; Kapstein, 1992; Peterson, 
1992; Sandal, 2011; Youde, 2005). In particular, this re-
search has shown that the European region—with its 
ongoing processes of integration, shared democratic 
values, supranational institutions, and transnational in-
teractions—is highly conducive to the formation of ep-
istemic communities (Cross, 2011; Howorth, 2004; Pe-
terson & Bomberg, 1999; Radaelli, 1999b; Verdun, 
1999; Zito, 2001). In previous work, I have examined 
nine separate case studies of epistemic communities in 
the European context, both historical and contempo-
rary (Cross, 2007, 2011). This has enabled me to com-
pare the ways in which epistemic communities work, 
determining whether they are nascent, emerging, 
weak, or strong. This previous research also demon-
strates how epistemic communities can be located 
both inside and outside of formal institutions, and can 
be comprised both of scientists and of other kinds of 
experts. 
My aim here is to compliment this existing re-
search—without repeating the analysis in the introduc-
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tion to this special issue—through considering “non-
cases”, that is, examples that bring to light the limits of 
the epistemic community concept.1 Thus, this article is 
inherently restricted in scope, and seeks to shed light 
on a specific dimension of the concept, rather than 
providing a comprehensive survey of the literature and 
theoretical debates that have come before. Under 
what conditions might we expect expert groups not to 
constitute epistemic communities? Does this have 
bearing on the expert group’s future potential as an 
epistemic community? By necessity, these questions 
are actually prior to most research on epistemic com-
munities. Rather than focusing on identifying epistemic 
communities, and investigating the nature of their in-
fluence, I explore some of the conditions that are con-
ducive for an epistemic community to emerge in the 
first place, and the conditions that make their exist-
ence less likely. At a certain point on the strong-weak 
spectrum of epistemic community influence, the idea 
that an expert group could constitute an epistemic 
community drops away entirely. 
This article examines the cases of the European De-
fence Agency (EDA) and EU Intelligence Analysis Centre 
(IntCen) to argue that although they are comprised of 
high-level security experts, they do not constitute (or 
contain) epistemic communities. I argue that the ex-
perts that populate both the EDA and IntCen lack the 
qualities that make them more than the sum of their 
parts, and as a result, they do not thus possess the po-
litical will to exercise collective agency beyond their 
formal mandate. In considering why this is the case, I 
seek to sharpen the parameters of what constitutes 
epistemic communities, and to add to our understand-
ing of why they emerge. 
Specifically, I hypothesize that if a group of experts 
work together within a highly formal institutional setting 
that is characterized by hierarchy and a limited man-
date, epistemic community emergence is less likely. 
Second, I hypothesize that if the expertise of a group 
stems from professional backgrounds that value secre-
cy—such as in the fields of intelligence, certain corpo-
rate sectors, computer technology, journalism, and so 
on—epistemic community emergence is also more likely 
restricted because these professions are less open to in-
formal interaction, information-sharing, deliberation, 
and networked communications. Thus, in some cases, 
institutional context and the nature of the profession 
make epistemic community emergence more challenging. 
The article is organized as follows. The next section 
briefly reviews some of the literature on epistemic 
                                                          
1 Richard Ned Lebow (2010) writes extensively about the im-
portance of contingency in explaining events in international 
relations, and the value of considering counterfactuals to 
show this. While I will not try to construct a story of what 
might have been, I will examine why potential cases of epis-
temic communities failed to materialize. 
communities, and situates my argument about the lim-
its of epistemic communities within this. Subsequently, 
I examine the case studies of the EDA and IntCen, and 
explain why they do not constitute or contain epistem-
ic communities, despite being comprised of experts. 
Finally, I conclude that expert groups that do not con-
stitute epistemic communities are not merely weak or 
nascent cases. Rather, they are fundamentally different 
kinds of actors, and are unlikely to emerge as epistemic 
communities without fundamental change to either 
the bureaucracies or professions to which they belong. 
2. The Concept of Epistemic Communities and Its 
Limits 
In a nutshell, epistemic communities have been de-
fined as networks of experts who persuade others of 
their shared norms and policy goals by virtue of their 
professional knowledge. An epistemic community is 
rarely so broad as to include an entire discipline. Ra-
ther, all of its members must have the expertise neces-
sary to understand the issues at stake, to interpret the 
information similarly, and then to form the same goals 
about what should be done. The group’s policy aims 
have to reflect their expert knowledge—and not some 
other motivation—otherwise they lose authority with 
their target audience, which in the area of security pol-
icy is usually elite decision-makers. A strong epistemic 
community seeks to go beyond their formal profes-
sional role as a group, and is often able to persuade 
decision-makers to fundamentally change the nature of 
their policy aims. A weak or nascent epistemic commu-
nity may be able to achieve incremental change over 
time, but only on occasion or without a high level of 
ambition. 
Haas defines the concept as, “a network of profes-
sionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area” 
(Haas, 1992a, p. 3). In other words, epistemic commu-
nities must have an authoritative claim on knowledge 
to impact policy outcomes. Naturally, knowledge itself 
may be socially constructed, but epistemic communi-
ties must nonetheless have a means of objectively rec-
ognizing the validity of their knowledge. As Haas de-
scribes, epistemic communities (1) share professional 
judgment on a policy issue, (2) weigh the validity of 
their policy goals in their area of expertise, (3) engage 
in a common set of practices with respect to the prob-
lem area with the goal of improving human welfare, 
and (4) share principled beliefs (Haas, 2001, pp. 11578-
11579). Thus, there is an ideational core that brings to-
gether these components of professional expertise. 
Peter Haas, Amy Verdun, Claudio Radaelli, and oth-
ers have applied the concept of epistemic community 
to empirical case studies of environmentalists, econo-
mists, and scientists. All agree that epistemic commu-
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nities exercise agency only when there is a kind of con-
textual gap—uncertainty—that allows them to do so 
(Haas, 1992a; Radaelli, 1999a; Verdun, 1999). To deter-
mine when epistemic communities will likely have the 
most influence, Radaelli argues that it is important to 
find these “conditions of radical uncertainty and political 
visibility” (Radaelli, 1999a, p. 763). Usually this comes in 
the wake of some kind of crisis or triggering event. Epis-
temic communities may exist prior to being “called” to 
action, but according to these scholars their impact is 
contingent upon this new source of uncertainty. 
Adding to this literature, I have highlighted a num-
ber of key points that enable us to more clearly recog-
nize epistemic communities when we look for them 
(Cross, 2013a). First, it should be understood that the 
process of professionalization and professionalism it-
self are at the heart of epistemic community cohesion. 
This is often where common points of reference and 
behavioral rules arise and are internalized. Second, I 
argue that epistemic communities do not simply exist 
or not exist, but can be characterized as strong or 
weak. Once an epistemic community comes together, 
it can exercise varying degrees of agency. Third, it 
should be acknowledged that non-scientific knowledge 
can be just as influential as scientific knowledge. Dip-
lomats, judges, defence experts, high-ranking military 
officials, bankers, and international lawyers, among 
others, all have just as much of a claim to authoritative 
knowledge as scientists. And finally, I contend that ep-
istemic communities are often always at work, and 
thus it is not necessary to look for a triggering crisis or 
episodes of uncertainty to observe their influence, as 
Haas and other contributors to the 1992 special issue 
have argued. While it is true that a crisis of uncertainty 
may provide an opportune time for epistemic commu-
nities to gain a voice, they are often quite influential 
even in the absence of such a triggering event. After all, 
uncertainty is a built-in feature of the international sys-
tem, especially in the EU, which by its nature is a work-
in-progress with no agreed-upon end-goal.  
In addition, there are at least three indications (see 
Table 1) that a group of experts might constitute an ep-
istemic community or not. A first indication of the 
presence of an epistemic community is whether an in-
stitutional group or committee seems to act as more 
than the sum of its parts. Is it producing outcomes that 
go beyond the expectations of its formal functions? A 
second indication is whether its members know each 
other or have worked with each other in previous set-
tings. If so, they might meet often outside of work and 
in informal settings. Such interaction, going beyond the 
call of duty, would suggest that they have opportuni-
ties to really deliberate on issues important to them. 
For this to have significance, such interactions naturally 
benefit from smaller numbers of individuals involved. A 
third indication is whether or not the group shares a 
particular culture and professional norms that are in-
dependent of their formal function. Together these 
three criteria are helpful in distinguishing not only the 
difference between a strong or weak epistemic com-
munity, but also between a weak epistemic communi-
ty, and an ordinary bureaucratic committee or other 
type of actor. 
Table 1. Three indications of the presence of an epis-
temic community. 
Indications of an 
Epistemic 
Community  
Evidence Implications 
Its members act 
as more than the 
sum of their 
parts 
Going beyond 
formal 
expectations as a 
group 
Persuading 
others of policy 
initiatives that 
were not 
previously on the 
table 
Its members 
have had 
previous 
professional 
encounters with 
each other 
Working 
together in past 
jobs, holding the 
same position at 
various times, 
interacting 
informally 
outside of work, 
etc. 
Developing an 
esprit de corps 
more readily, 
sharing 
professional 
goals, etc. 
Its members 
share a 
distinctive 
culture & shared 
professional 
norms beyond 
the bureaucracy 
they inhabit 
Meeting quality 
is high and 
effective, i.e. 
more time is 
spent on the 
substance of 
issues, 
interactions are 
relatively 
frequent 
Agreements and 
common 
positions are 
found more 
readily than in 
similar 
bureaucracies, 
and these are not 
simply lowest 
common 
denominator 
outcomes 
Much work has been done in explaining what to 
look for in recognizing an epistemic community, as well 
as anticipating how persuasive it is. But what precondi-
tions contribute to or detract from the existence of an 
epistemic community in the first place? Looking at the 
qualities that do not define epistemic communities is 
useful in ensuring that the framework is not overde-
termined. I argue that institutional and professional 
context, in particular, have a direct bearing on the 
presence or absence of the three indicators outlined 
above. First, if a group of experts is housed within a 
highly formal institutional setting, with strict hierarchy 
and goals that explicitly limit its mandate from the out-
set, this is a difficult environment to foster the exist-
ence of epistemic communities. However, a limited 
mandate on its own is not enough to preclude epistem-
ic community emergence. The example of the Commit-
tee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) within the 
Council of the EU illustrates this well. Coreper was cre-
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ated with the limited mandate to prepare meetings for 
the Council of Ministers, but over time Coreper quickly 
became “a de facto decision making body” (Heinisch & 
Mesner, 2005, p. 1) as it emerged as a powerful epis-
temic community in its own right (Cross, 2007, 2011). 
When a limited mandate is combined with a highly 
formal and hierarchical institutional setting, this re-
stricts the existence of epistemic communities quite 
significantly, as discussed in the EDA case study. Even 
though Coreper is formally an intergovernmental insti-
tution, with each member representing each of the 
member states, it nonetheless has benefitted from be-
ing a horizontal body with a sense of equality across 
the diplomatic experts who comprise it. No such truly 
transnational space exists within the EDA, despite the 
fact that it is a supranational bureaucracy; although, as 
I will discuss, it does emanate outward from it. 
Second, if a group of experts comes from a profes-
sion in which the qualities of expertise explicitly work 
against information-sharing, informality, deliberation, 
persuasion, and transparency among people in the 
same profession, this also creates limitations for epis-
temic community emergence. Such professions can be 
wide-ranging. Intelligence professionals or spies—as in 
the case of IntCen—value secrecy as an integral part of 
their expertise. Defence industry experts have tradi-
tionally guarded their technological advancements so 
that they can be at the cutting edge of their own fields 
and distinguish themselves from those in other coun-
tries or corporations. Indeed, in many corporate envi-
ronments, intellectual capital is valued specifically be-
cause you are the only one to possess it. Similarly, 
experts in the computer and information technology 
fields typically keep their breakthroughs secret—either 
because they use this knowledge for nefarious activi-
ties like hacking or spying, or to effectively counteract 
those engaged in such activities. Inventors, as well, will 
keep their discoveries under wraps until they can pro-
tect their discoveries with patents. And of course jour-
nalists, both in their relationship with sources and 
competition with peers, must learn the value of secre-
cy as a central part of their professional expertise. 
While there are always exceptions, for the most part, a 
built-in quality of these professions and others is the 
ability to safeguard against the kind of information-
sharing, deliberation, persuasion, and informality that 
can lead to networked interactions, and to the for-
mation of epistemic communities. 
At the same time, it is important to note that just 
because an expert group does not constitute an epis-
temic community does not mean that it is somehow 
ineffective or falling below its potential. It may simply 
be a different sort of actor. There are many kinds of 
transnational actors or networks—often comprised of 
professionals—that scholars have identified and re-
searched in depth. Beyond epistemic communities, 
these include communities of practice (Adler & Pouliot, 
2011), business networks, advocacy networks (Keck & 
Sikkink, 1998), interpretive communities (Johnstone, 
2005), and argumentative communities (Collins, 1998), 
among others. Many of these groups are held together 
by shared values and a common motivation to achieve 
specific goals in the international arena, whether to 
improve environmental regulation, protect human 
rights, or promote EU integration in new policy areas.  
Moreover, it is still possible that a committee or 
expert group could achieve the outcomes we might ex-
pect of an epistemic community, but without actually 
being one. After all, groups of individuals can exercise 
independent agency for a variety of reasons and with 
many kinds of motivations. Transgovernmental net-
works, communities of practice, and advocacy net-
works, may not push for policies based on their expert 
knowledge, but may still achieve outcomes that go be-
yond expectations if we were to only consider mem-
ber-state preferences alone. 
3. Two “Non-Cases” 
EU security policy is an area in which there are at least 
several Brussels-based epistemic communities. EU se-
curity epistemic communities are comprised of diplo-
mats, military experts, security researchers, and civilian 
crisis management experts, among others, with a rec-
ognizable claim to expertise in both internal and exter-
nal security policy (Cross, 2011). They have been 
shown to significantly impact outcomes of EU security 
policy beyond what would be expected by looking only 
at member-states’ initial preferences. But just because 
there are many examples of security epistemic com-
munities in the EU, does not mean that all groups of 
security experts comprise epistemic communities. In-
deed, they may not even constitute weak or nascent 
epistemic communities, despite working together on a 
daily basis and making decisions that influence policy in 
some way. By focusing on an issue area that is heavily 
populated with experts, and within which epistemic 
communities are numerous, it is easier to see what dif-
ferentiates certain groups of experts from those that 
form epistemic communities. 
Both the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the 
Intelligence Analysis Centre (IntCen) are EU agencies, 
based in Brussels, and populated with security experts. 
Although there are two possibilities—the agency as a 
whole could function as an epistemic community, or 
the agency may contain one or more epistemic com-
munities within it—I will argue that the professional 
and institutional contexts in both cases are not condu-
cive to the existence of epistemic communities. As 
such, there is little evidence of the three indications 
discussed in the previous section, i.e. outcomes that go 
beyond formal agency functions, frequent informal de-
liberation, and culture and professional norms that are 
independent of the agency. It should be noted that 
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these cases are not intended to be exhaustive analyses 
of the EDA and IntCen, but rather test cases for my hy-
potheses that professional and institutional context 
matter in fostering the growth of epistemic communi-
ties. Table 2 below summarizes these findings. 
3.1. The European Defence Agency 
The EDA was founded in 2004 with the aim of improv-
ing the EU’s defence capabilities through promoting 
collaboration, common initiatives, and innovative solu-
tions to the EU’s security needs. As an intergovernmen-
tal agency, the EDA is designed to bring member states 
and their priorities together in the area of armaments 
and defence research, including investment and pro-
curement, with the overarching objective of improving 
member states’ collective military capability over the 
longer term. Rather than seeking a particular goal in a 
particular form, it searches for synergies across priori-
ties, member-states, and projects. EDA policy aims 
mainly include pooling and sharing of resources, 
achieving interoperability, diminishing duplication of 
spending, emphasizing civil-military strategies, and 
agreeing on best practices.  
The EDA’s steering board, comprised of the De-
fence ministers of the member states, has the respon-
sibility to make decisions about the overall guidelines 
for EDA operations. Defence ministers meet twice per 
year, but specific national representatives meet more 
frequently. In terms of the permanent staff, there are 
around 130 professionals working in the EDA. Each 
staff member possesses a high level of expertise, with 
extensive previous background in the defence field or 
in the military. The EDA’s professional staff is selected 
based on merit, not a quota system or an effort to rep-
resent each member state equally (Giergerich, 2009). 
This is in contrast to other previously identified epis-
temic communities in the security area, such as the EU 
Military Committee or Civilian Crisis Management 
Committee (Cross, 2011). These committees, while 
housed within the formal Council hierarchy, are still 
horizontal in and of themselves. Each member state 
has a representative who sits in the committee, and 
they operate on the principle of one member state, 
one voice. Thus, the sense of equality among these mil-
itary or civilian crisis professionals is strong, enabling 
more deliberation, informality, and information-
sharing. Within the EDA, however, department sizes 
tend to be small, and the space for transnationalism 
within the EDA is not as strong as in an institution like 
the Council of Ministers, which is comprised of com-
mittees and working groups with a representative from 
each member state, all of whom have equal standing. 
Beyond the institutional structure within the EDA, 
these professionals interact with around 4,000 defence 
specialists from across the participating member states 
(EDA, n.d.). EDA experts coordinate the formation of 
so-called Integrated Development Teams tasked with 
the work of determining defence capability needs in a 
wide range of areas. They also form around 20 Project 
Teams with national experts, focusing on specific de-
fence initiatives that member states wish to pursue to-
gether, such as the helicopter initiative. Finally, they 
form Capability Technology Groups (CapTech) that 
work on collaborative research and technology projects 
with experts from participating member states. Some-
times the experts in these groups are also drawn from 
academia, industry, or other research groups. With the 
proliferation of so many expert groups in the field of 
defence, and all with connections to the EDA, it may be 
surprising that the EDA itself does not house epistemic 
communities of some kind.  
The key distinction is that EDA experts are fulfilling 
a coordinating role, rather than becoming agents for 
change in their own right. The EDA serves as a kind of 
hub for these larger, defence-expert networks. This is 
actually quite similar to the ways in which European 
think tanks devoted to EU issues work as well. EU think 
tanks host numerous meetings, seminars, and confer-
ences on the topic of EU security, bringing hundreds of 
people together to discuss important security topics. 
However, these think tanks do not have close ties with 
one another, tend not to advance shared policy goals, 
and generally serve more as forums for other profes-
sionals to meet rather than acting as policy leaders in 
their own right. Similarly, EDA experts also serve in this 
function vis-à-vis the numerous networks of defence 
experts that are connected to their activities. While 
some of these networks may very well constitute epis-
temic communities, EDA experts serve to coordinate 
and manage the network of national defence experts, 
as well as to get a better sense of what member states 
want through these interactions. EDA experts them-
selves do not comprise epistemic communities in their 
own right. In the words of the agency itself, these net-
works of experts “are crucial for EDA’s work as they 
ensure coherence with national priorities” (EDA, n.d.).  
The EDA’s activities have mushroomed in recent 
years, but not because of any specific push from EDA 
staff. Rather, the EDA’s “way of working” is to face 
outwards instead of inwards. That is, it is a facilitator, 
information supplier, and momentum generator, bring-
ing member states together on goals they have agreed 
to, but may not be able to achieve without the help of 
the EDA. The agency exerts light pressure on member-
states to achieve follow-through, without any specific 
effort to persuade them to do something that they are 
not already comfortable with (Arnould, 2011). The rea-
son for this is that the EDA as whole takes a more 
pragmatic and piece meal approach, rather than push-
ing for an overarching goal, like achieving more inte-
gration among member states. The agency may ulti-
mately encourage more integration, but this is more 
indirect, rather than purposeful. As an information 
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supplier, it serves as a clearinghouse for information 
that member-states would not otherwise have about 
each other (Giergerich, 2009). On its own, this infor-
mation can “name & shame” member states while 
keeping the EDA neutral. But EDA staff also have a 
norm of being flexible in creating a framework for ar-
maments integration so they can adjust the level and 
nature of ambition based on member-state needs 
(Trybus, 2006) and desires to participate (EDA, n.d.).  
Ultimately, it is clear that the overarching impetus 
behind EDA initiatives comes mainly from the member 
states, and not from epistemic community activity 
stemming from the EDA. Indeed, even in recent years, 
member states’ representatives have spoken strongly 
about the need to create a common European De-
fence, characterizing integration as a “non-choice”. 
Wolfgang Ischinger, former state secretary of the Ger-
man foreign office, writes, “starting to Europeanize our 
defence is the only reasonable way forward” (Isching-
er, 2012). Belgian Defence minister Pieter de Crem 
said, “it is better to have collective capabilities rather 
than non-existent national ones” (de Crem, 2012, p. 5). 
The Franco-German Declaration of February 6, 2012 
states, “In times of strategic uncertainty and limited re-
sources, strengthened defence requires common pro-
curement” (Franco-German Declaration, 2012, p. 2). An 
Italian document proposing goals for the December 
2013 European Council on Defence states, “If EU mem-
ber states do not pool their efforts, where appropriate 
on certain common requirements or capabilities, none 
of them, nor Europe as a whole, will be able to guaran-
tee its own security” (Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
& Italian Ministry of Defence, 2013). Through an analy-
sis of EDA public statements, André Barrinha writes 
that the EDA: 
has expanded the “existential condition” justifica-
tion, and included all the other arguments within 
this one. The EDA has, in that matter, become the 
organising core within the European Union regard-
ing a European discourse on defence industries. 
More than the ESDP, more than the potential posi-
tive or negative relations with the United States, 
and more than the mere economic rationale, Eu-
rope must unite for its own survival—this is no 
longer an option (Barrinha, 2010, p. 481). 
The image of the EDA as an “organizing core” is telling. 
Indeed, as the above quotations indicate, member 
states’ statements about the importance of the work of 
the EDA are typically stronger than what EDA officials 
themselves say.  
I argue that a significant reason why the EDA lacks 
epistemic community activity, and as such, does not 
seem to go beyond its formal mandate as an EU agen-
cy, is that it is an example of a bureaucracy that houses 
experts in a highly formalized and hierarchical institu-
tional structure. From the outset, the EDA was de-
signed to serve the member states rather than to direct 
them. The fact that the internal workings of the EDA do 
not rely on the principle of one representative from 
each of the member states in each of the various direc-
torates, also adds to the sense of hierarchy, instead of 
allowing for horizontal and transnational spaces within 
the agency. Moreover, defence integration is voluntary 
on the part of the member states, and the profession-
als within the EDA do not aspire to change this. Rather, 
they allow the member states to take the lead in craft-
ing the direction and degree of defence integration 
(Arnould, 2011). To be sure, in its young history, the 
work of the EDA has grown in scope and scale, adding 
dozens of projects and goals. There is nothing in its rec-
ord thus far that would indicate any serious failings. Yet, 
it has adhered closely to its original mandate, and has 
stuck to its role of generating momentum behind the 
expressed political will of the member states. This con-
trasts with similar expert groups housed within more 
horizontal institutional structures—like the EUMC and 
Civcom—that do act as epistemic communities. 
3.2. The EU Intelligence Analysis Centre 
IntCen’s chief mandate is to provide intelligence analy-
sis and strategic assessments to EU decision-makers, 
especially in the area of counter-terrorism. The agency 
operates twenty-four hours a day and seven days a 
week to ensure that it is able to provide rapid updates, 
especially to the High Representative. IntCen intelli-
gence experts work closely with the EU Military Staff, 
External Action Service, and to some extent, the Euro-
pean Defence Agency (Cross, 2013b). They routinely 
provide “flash reports” on international crises as they 
develop, and may issue early warnings in particularly 
urgent cases. They also constantly monitor potential 
terrorist threats, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and conflict-prone locations around the 
globe, so that they are prepared to respond immedi-
ately in the event of a crisis (Cross, 2013b). On a medi-
um-term basis, they provide several services involving 
the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), such 
as recommending procedures for crisis management, 
risk and situation assessments, and crisis response fa-
cilities. This kind of readily accessible intelligence at the 
EU level is a crucial component of the EU’s ability to 
speak with one voice in terms of common foreign poli-
cy, and to respond quickly to events. If analysts are on-
location they may serve as the operational contact for 
the high representative. On a longer-term basis, IntCen 
experts focus on strategic assessments that can build 
stronger resistance to terrorist attacks over time. For 
example, analysts deal with aviation security, cyber-
security, and problems of radicalization and recruit-
ment (Hertzberger, 2007, p. 68). Their priority is to gain 
a better understanding of the internal dynamics, fi-
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nancing, ideology, and potential targets of terrorist 
networks (Duke, 2006, p. 607). 
The internal structure of IntCen is not excessively 
hierarchical, but the professional environment is highly 
formal and restrictive, as it is in the nature of the intel-
ligence profession to avoid transparency and infor-
mation sharing. Even as far as intelligence goes, IntCen 
itself is very secretive and closed off from public scruti-
ny, making it difficult even to pinpoint basic elements 
of its structure, responsibilities, and evolving role. We 
do know that IntCen is comprised of both decision-
making bodies and implementation bodies. The deci-
sion-making bodies consist of the Intelligence Steering 
Board, chaired by the High Representative and Vice-
President of the Commission, and the Intelligence 
Working Group, chaired by the directors of IntCen and 
the EU Military Staff’s Intelligence division. The imple-
mentation bodies consist of IntCen’s expert staff itself, 
and the intelligence directorate of the EU military staff. 
Unlike Europol, IntCen prepares intelligence analyses 
for EU decision-makers, rather than authorities in the 
member states. Its target audience includes High Rep-
resentative Federica Mogherini, Counter-Terrorism Co-
ordinator Gilles de Kerchove, Coreper II, PSC, the 
Working Party on Terrorism, the Article 36 Committee, 
the Policy Unit, and decision-makers in the area of po-
lice and judicial cooperation (Müller-Wille, 2008, p. 59). 
IntCen is comprised of experts who have autonomy, 
and a mandate to improve the EU’s intelligence-sharing 
sphere. It has a staff of around 80 experts,2 which in-
cludes analysts of both civilian and military back-
grounds, as well as other support staff. The analysts 
are typically seconded from national intelligence ser-
vices, and are double-hatted to both (Hertzberger, 
2007, p. 69). After the Lisbon Treaty, the number of 
analysts within IntCen increased (Council of the EU, 
2011). Each year, IntCen intelligence experts produce 
some 100 intelligence reports, 40% of which deal with 
terrorism assessments (Hertzberger, 2007, p. 66).  
IntCen professionals have no formal mandate to 
engage in intelligence gathering, as traditionally under-
stood, and rely to a significant extent on intelligence 
provided by member states on a voluntary basis. For 
example, they receive information from the French, 
German, and Italian spy satellites for imagery, as well 
as from member states’ diplomatic reports. Between 
seventeen and twenty EU member states provide na-
tional intelligence to IntCen, so not all member states 
                                                          
2 It was reduced from a staff of around 110–120 when it was 
still SitCen (Rettman, February 2010), and had a somewhat 
broader remit, such as the Crisis Room for keeping track of 
media reports, and services involving consular support, 
among others. IntCen is more focused specifically on gather-
ing and analyzing intelligence; some of the more secondary 
functions that existed under SitCen, are no longer part of 
IntCen. 
participate, but all twenty-seven do receive IntCen’s 
reports. Each member state can even stipulate who is 
allowed to see information they provide to IntCen, be-
yond those who regularly consume the reports, under 
the so-called “originator principle” (Rettman, 2010, 
November 18). To the extent that IntCen experts do 
originate intelligence themselves, it usually comes from 
open-source information, or on-the-ground observa-
tions in crises. For example, IntCen professionals can 
use US commercial satellite imagery, Internet chat-
room intelligence, media reports, and information 
gathered from within the European External Action 
Service. In addition, these intelligence experts routinely 
travel to crisis zones and CSDP operation locations to 
gain a better sense of real conditions on the ground. 
As with the case of the EDA, there is little evidence 
that the intelligence experts within IntCen have exer-
cised agency as an epistemic community. Intrinsic to 
the intelligence profession is the ability to maintain a 
high degree of secrecy, especially when it comes to 
transnational interactions. Moreover, for IntCen pro-
fessionals, the primary goal is to do their work better 
rather than redefine their work to change the direction 
of policy in the intelligence area (Cross, 2013b). How-
ever, rather than comprising epistemic communities, I 
argue that the professional staff within IntCen is actual-
ly part of a larger transgovernmental network of intelli-
gence experts across Europe.  
Transgovernmental cooperation more generally is 
the process by which sub-units of governments engage 
in direct and autonomous interaction separate from 
nation states (Keohane & Nye, 1974). Transgovern-
mental networks can be quite informal, and do not 
necessarily have a specific agenda or policy goal in 
mind (Grevi, 2008; Thurner & Binder, 2009). Rather, 
they are more focused on processes of governance. 
Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004) has documented how 
transgovernmental networks across the globe—judges, 
legislators, regulators, and so on—are increasingly 
coming together in this way to share best practices and 
knowhow. This is also increasingly true of intelligence 
experts across Europe, of which IntCen professionals 
are a central part. A key example of this sharing of best 
practices is in the area of open-source intelligence, 
which is of growing importance in the intelligence pro-
fession with the widespread use of the internet and so-
cial media (Pallaris, 2009). As a result, increasing num-
bers of intelligence professionals participate in 
informal networks that enhance their ability to do their 
job well. 
For example, Eurosint Forum, founded in 2006, is a 
non-governmental, non-profit organization based in 
Brussels that holds around five workshops a year and 
comprises a network of around 400 intelligence profes-
sionals, at all ranks, from member states’ intelligence 
agencies, private-sector organizations, and EU institu-
tions such as the EU Military Staff, SitCen, and Europol. 
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Each workshop usually consists of around 35 partici-
pants, but Eurosint also holds one or two larger con-
ferences each year with more than 100 participants. 
According to Eurosint General Manager, Axel Dyèvre, 
these workshops and conferences have many opportu-
nities for informal interactions that clearly create an 
atmosphere of trust, emphasize an exchange of ideas, 
and allow for brainstorming (Dyèvre, 2011). Rather 
than discussing topical and potentially confidential is-
sues, the focus is on getting to know each other, find-
ing areas of potential collaboration, and discussing 
practices. Several shared projects have emerged from 
these Eurosint gatherings (Dyèvre, 2011). Besides the 
Eurosint Forum, EU intelligence experts have long met 
in more informal settings to foster transgovernmental 
cooperation, such as in the so-called Berne Group or 
Budapest Club. This kind of interaction is leading to the 
creation of a kind of European intelligence space 
(Cross, 2013b), but one that still carefully protects in-
formation from crossing borders.  
Table 2. Summary of findings in the cases of the EDA 
and IntCen. 
Indications of 
epistemic 
communities 
EDA—a highly 
formal & 
hierarchical 
bureaucracy 
IntCen—a 
secretive 
profession 
Its members act 
as more than the 
sum of their 
parts 
Strong 
adherence to 
original 
mandate—
coordinating 
role, information 
supplier, etc. 
Highly formal 
and restrictive 
professional 
environment, 
closed off, 
member-states 
provide 
information & 
are protective of 
it 
Its members 
have had 
previous 
professional 
encounters with 
each other  
EDA staff have 
interacted with 
professionals in 
the wider 
defence industry, 
and others from 
a large number 
of diverse expert 
groups 
Seconded from 
national 
intelligence 
services, and 
thus have not 
worked together 
previously  
Its members 
share a 
distinctive 
culture & shared 
professional 
norms beyond 
the bureaucracy 
they inhabit 
Culture & norms 
reflect the 
institution’s 
goals—flexible 
targets, member-
states 
preferences, 
coordination, 
pragmatism, etc. 
Emerging 
institutional 
culture, but 
focused on 
process (i.e. best 
practices) rather 
than substance 
Thus, IntCen is an example of an agency that is 
comprised of security experts whose profession is high-
ly limited in terms of fostering epistemic community 
emergence. Since the need to keep information secret 
is wrapped into the very expertise of spies, in many 
ways deliberation, transparency, and information-
sharing is highly restricted. Nonetheless, IntCen experts 
have found ways of networking despite this. They focus 
more on professionalism and best practices rather than 
the real substance of their knowledge. In her study, 
Hertzberger (2007) finds that personal contacts among 
IntCen experts have actually led to better intelligence 
cooperation in Europe over time, and towards an 
emerging institutional culture. Thus, like in the case of 
the EDA, these experts comprise a different kind of ac-
tor, and one that is larger than the Intelligence Agency 
itself. But the nature of their profession prevents the 
emergence of an epistemic community because shar-
ing their knowledge goes against the nature of their 
expertise. Table 2 summarizes the suggested findings 
from these two illustrative cases. 
4. Conclusion 
These two “non-cases” show that it is not really the 
policy area itself that determines the emergence of ep-
istemic communities. After all, numerous epistemic 
communities exist in the same policy area as the ex-
perts that work in the EDA and IntCen. For example, 
the EU Military Committee, Civilian Crisis Management 
Committee, and Political and Security Committee con-
stitute epistemic communities of varying degrees of in-
fluence in the area of external security policy.  
Rather, these case studies suggest that bureaucratic 
structure and the nature of the profession of those in-
volved can serve to limit epistemic community for-
mation. Much of the empirical research on epistemic 
communities focuses on single case studies of epistem-
ic communities and traces their role in influencing poli-
cy choices. As such, the literature tends to take for 
granted that epistemic communities either exist or 
they do not. My aim in this article is to take this rea-
soning a step back to explore the conditions that might 
limit epistemic community emergence in the first 
place. I argue that institutions whose internal structure 
is hierarchical and formal, like in the case of the EDA, 
typically do not enable enough of a critical mass at any 
single horizontal level to encourage epistemic commu-
nity formation. They also tend to advance a strict man-
date from the start. Thus, they operate as a traditional 
bureaucracy, only carrying out the autonomy granted 
to them, rather than trying to go beyond this.  
Secondly, professions that require secrecy and non-
transparency with others in the same profession, or as 
an integral quality of their professional expertise, are 
also likely to limit epistemic community formation. This 
is certainly true in the case of the intelligence profes-
sion. By way of contrast, the diplomatic profession 
does tend to foster the existence of epistemic commu-
nities (Cross, 2007). Even though diplomats must main-
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tain a degree of secrecy, deliberation is a fundamental 
part of their profession and the ability to share 
knowledge about possible areas of agreement is cru-
cial. The “art of compromise” is cultivated within dip-
lomatic corps, and networks of professional diplomats 
understand that they can enhance trust by knowing 
when and how to share secret information with each 
other. Diplomatic deliberation often occurs without 
public scrutiny, but part of what enables fruitful, in-
formal discussion, especially in the European context, 
is the ability for diplomats to speak frankly about 
where they can find common ground. 
Many kinds of networks, groups, institutions, and 
bureaucracies have influence on policies and outcomes 
in international relations. However, it is important to 
recognize that they also have different kinds of influ-
ence. Thus, I am not arguing that the EDA and IntCen 
are weak or ineffective agencies, but rather that they 
seek influence in ways that conform closely to their 
mandate, and do not stretch the boundaries of this. By 
contrast, epistemic community influence often involves 
changing the very basis of the way states operate in 
the international system, as well as the rules they fol-
low in their interactions. This requires high levels of 
status and persuasion in the eyes of state leaders. 
Thus, in the cases of IntCen and the EDA, as long as 
professional and institutional context remain un-
changed, it is unlikely that epistemic communities 
would form in the future. 
These arguments are based on just two illustrative 
cases, but future research could further explore the 
limits of epistemic community emergence with a spe-
cific focus on which kinds of professions and bureau-
cratic structures might be more or less conducive to 
this. For example, the cases of the EU Military Staff and 
the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability are similar 
cases of supranational bureaucracies that are also hi-
erarchical. In particular, it would be valuable to explore 
the preconditions for epistemic community emergence 
in other countries and regions of the world with vary-
ing types of regimes. In authoritarian states, for exam-
ple, bureaucracies are typically extremely hierarchical 
and formal, and a greater number of professions may 
be prevented from engaging in deliberation and net-
working. Epistemic community emergence may be vir-
tually impossible in these more extreme cases. And in 
other democracies, certain professions may have dif-
ferent norms and practices than in the European re-
gion. Such comparative work is useful in mapping out 
the various conditions that limit or encourage the ex-
istence and influence of epistemic communities. 
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